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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. DEATH CERTIFICATES ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
In Society of Professional Journalists v. Sexton1 the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that a Department of Health and
Environmental Control (DHEC) regulation 2 limiting disclosure
of death certificates contravenes the Freedom of Information
Act s (FOIA) and is, therefore, invalid.4 The court held that be-
cause death certificates are public records, they are not exempt
from the disclosure requirements of the FOIA.5
1. 283 S.C. 563, 324 S.E.2d 313 (1984).
2. The regulation provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the State Registrar or the county regis-
trar shall disclose information contained in vital records only when he is satis-
fied that the applicant therefore [sic] has a direct and tangible interest in the
content of the record and that the information contained therein is necessary
for the determination or protection of a personal or property right.
(2) In the case of a death or fetal death certificate, a surviving relative or
his legal representative shall be considered to have a direct and tangible
interest.
S.C. Dep't of Health & Envt'l Control R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 61-19-39(a)(1976).
The term "legal representative" is defined to include "an attorney, physician, funeral
director, insurance company, or an authorized agency acting in behalf of the registrant or
his family." Id. § 61-19-39(b). A death certificate indicates the cause of death and is
certified by a physician and medical examiner. Record at 61.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-10 to -110 (Supp. 1984).
4. 283 S.C. at 567, 324 S.E.2d at 315.
5. Id. at 566, 324 S.E.2d at 314.
1
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The court rejected DHEC's argument that death certificates
are medical records and, thus, exempt from public disclosure
under the FOIA.6 The court reasoned that although a death cer-
tificate is medically certified, it is merely a legally mandated
conclusory statement of the decedent's cause of death." The
court also rejected DHEC's assertion that the disclosure of death
certificates constitutes an invasion of privacy and, thus, is ex-
empt under section 30-4-40(a)(2).8 The court observed that the
right of privacy must be asserted by the person holding that
right: in this case, a decedent. The court also noted that the
right of privacy does not prohibit the publication of information
of legitimate public interest, such as the death certificate of a
murder victim.9
The court invalidated the DHEC regulation because it con-
flicted with section 44-63-60 of the South Carolina Code,10 which
provides that death certificates be furnished upon request. The
court observed that while the Code specifically limits the class of
persons who may request a birth certificate," it places no re-
strictions on who may request a death certificate. Inferring that
section 44-63-60 thus mandates release of a death certificate to
anyone requesting it, the court held that the DHEC regulation
contradicted the code section and was, therefore, invalid. 2
The court's holding is consistent with the legislative intent
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(c)(Supp. 1984) exempts medical records from the dis-
closure requirements of the FOIA. The respondents did not appeal the lower court's
holding that the Medical Examiner's records are exempt. 283 S.C. at 565, 324 S.E.2d at
314.
7. Id. at 566, 324 S.E.2d at 314. The court rejected DHEC's contention that death
certificates were exempt under S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(3)(Supp. 1984), which ex-
empts information used in criminal investigations if premature disclosure would
prejudice the investigation. The court agreed that this exemption is important, but noted
that in this case the investigation had been concluded and the suspects tried before Ms.
Glass requested the information. 283 S.C. at 566, 324 S.E.2d at 315.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(2)(Supp. 1984). This section specifically exempts per-
sonal information that, if disclosed, would result in an unnecessary invasion of privacy.
9. 283 S.C. at 566, 324 S.E.2d at 315 (citing Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C.
330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956)(a news article about the birth of a baby to a twelve-year-old
mother is not an impermissible invasion of the parents' privacy)).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-63-60 (1976). Accord, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-51 (West.
1972).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-63-80 (Supp. 1984).
12. 283 S.C. at 567, 324 S.E.2d at 315 (citing Banks v. Batesburg Hauling Co., 202
S.C. 273, 24 S.E.2d 496 (1943)). See also S.C. Tax Comm'n v. S.C. Tax Bd. of Review,
278 S.C. 556, 299 S.E.2d 489 (1983); 2 Am JuR. 2D Administrative Law § 188 (1962).
2
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of the South Carolina FOIA: to provide access to information
affecting the public. 13 Although the FOIA has been adopted with
a similar objective by the majority of states, the South Carolina
Supreme Court is one of the first state courts to address whether
a death certificate is a public record under the FOIA. 4 The
court's conclusion that the circumstances surrounding a murder
are of legitimate public concern is consistent with case law deal-
ing with the issue of privacy.15 The court's holding, however,
fails to consider that the protection of other aspects of privacy
might outweigh the court's broad interpretation of the FOIA.
The court stated that it could find no public policy argument
outweighing the goals of the FOIA'6 and cited Cox Broadcasting
13. The General Assembly finds that it is vital in a democratic society that
public business be performed in an open and public manner as it conducts its
business so that citizens shall be advised of the performance of public officials
and of the decisions that are reached in public activity and in the formation of
public policy. Toward this end, this act is adopted, making it possible for citi-
zens, or their representatives, to learn and report fully the activities of their
public officials.
1978 S.C. Acts 1736, 1736.
14. See Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L.
REV. 971, 1163 (1975). For a general discussion of the FOIA, see id. at 971-1340. Indiana
is the only other jurisdiction that has directly addressed this issue. In Evansville-Vander-
burgh County Dep't of Health v. Evansville Printing Corp., the court held that a death
certificate is a public record. 165 Ind. App. 437, 332 N.E.2d 329 (1975). The court based
its holding on the Hughes Anti-Secrecy Act, which provides for public inspection of
records unless prohibited by law. Id. at 333. A Connecticut court, on the other hand,
chose to decide this issue on a case by case basis. Meriden Record Co. v. Browning, 6
Conn. Cir. Ct. 633, 294 A.2d 646, 648 (1971). A Wisconsin court held that when a record
is requested and there is no statutory exception, a writ of mandamus must be issued,
absent any reason for denying it. Hathaway v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 116 Wis.2d 388,
404, 342 N.W.2d 682, 690 (1984).
15. See Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956)(implying that
since events such as births are recorded in a public record, they are matters of public
interest). See also Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956) (the murder of
a child was a matter of public interest, and a news article with pictures of the victim did
not constitute an invasion of privacy); Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 101 Mich. Ap. 725,
300 N.W.2d 687 (1980)(news account of a death caused by fire was a legitimate public
concern).
16. 283 S.C. at 567, 324 S.E.2d at 315. See supra note 14. DHEC was primarily
concerned that if death certificates were available for inspection, highly personal infor-
mation beyond the scope of legitimate public concern would be revealed. Brief of Appel-
lant at 5. DHEC asserted that the main purpose of a death certificate is to promote
public health by providing accurate statistics indicating the cause of mortality in South
Carolina. DHEC reasoned that if these records were not kept confidential, physicians,
medical examiners, and coroners would not submit complete, accurate reports on causes
of deaths related to abortion, venereal disease, alcoholism, or other conditions potentially
3
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Corp. v. Cohn,17 apparently relying on the policy of protecting
the freedom of the press under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments. This policy, however, requires that privacy interests be
weighed along with the public right to information and the right
of the press to publish that information.""
The implications of Society of Professional Journalists v.
Sexton remain unclear. Under the court's broad holding, anyone
would be entitled to examine a death certificate. Thus, DHEC's
concern for privacy and confidentiality seems well founded. On
the other hand, DHEC did not offer any evidence indicating the
extent of public demand for death certificates. 19 It is probable
that most requests for death certificates will be initiated by re-
porters, seeking information on behalf of the general public.
Viewed from this perspective, the court's reasoning becomes
clearer and more compelling.
Emily E. Garrard
II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION FOR PROSTHETIC DEVICES LIMITED
Two recent decisions in workers' compensation law address
the issue of compensation for prosthetic devices. In Lail v. Rich-
land Wrecking Co.20 the court of appeals held that injury to a
prosthetic device was not a "personal injury" under South Caro-
lina law.21 The supreme court in Smith v. Eagle Construction
embarrassing to the decedent's family. Id. at 12-13. DHEC further claimed that public
disclosure of death certificates facilitates the fraudulent use of this information for false
identification. Id. at 13-14.
17. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). In Cox the Supreme Court held there was no cause of action
for invasion of privacy from the news publication of a deceased rape victim's name be-
cause the crime was of public interest and the information was available for public in-
spection through court documents.
18. Id. at 496-97. The Supreme Court feared that forbidding the publication of news
offensive to a reasonable person would lead to censorship. In Society of Professional
Journalists, on the other hand, DHEC argued that the test regarding public disclosure
should be "whether the information is truly governmental in nature .and properly subject
to disclosure, or purely personal and more properly protected from general release."
Brief of Appellant at 7-8.
19. See Record at 63. The court left it to the legislature to determine whether death
certificates should be specifically exempted from the disclosure requirements of the
FOIA. 283 S.C. at 567, 324 S.E.2d at 315.
20. 280 S.C. 532, 313 S.E.2d 342 (Ct. App. 1984).
21. Id. at 534, 313 S.E.2d at 343.
[Vol. 37
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Co.22 applied a 1980 amendment 23 retroactively to provide for
the lifetime repair and replacement of the employee's prosthetic
device. 4 These seemingly inconsistent results can be reconciled
by analyzing the facts of each case.
The respondent in Lail sought compensation for a hearing
aid which was broken beyond repair when he hit his head on a
pipe. 25 In a hearing before a South Carolina Industrial Commis-
sioner the stipulated facts indicated that the respondent wore a
hearing aid prior to his employment with Richland Wrecking
Company for reasons unrelated to this incident and that the ac-
cident occurred while in the scope of the respondent's employ-
ment.26 There was not, however, any mention of any physical
injury to the respondent.2 7 The commissioner ordered the insur-
ance carrier to pay the respondent the reasonable replacement
cost of the hearing aid, and the full South Carolina Industrial
Commission and the circuit court affirmed.28
The sole issue on appeal was whether the destruction of re-
spondent's hearing aid was an injury within the meaning of sec-
22. 282 S.C. 140, 318 S.E.2d 8 (1984).
23. The statute provides time periods for which medical treatment and supplies will
be furnished:
Medical, surgical, hospital and other treatment, including medical and sur-
gical supplies as may reasonably be required, for a period not exceeding ten
weeks from the date of an injury to effect a cure or give relief and for such
additional time as in the judgment of the Commission will tend to lessen the
period of disability and, in addition thereto, such original artificial members as
may be reasonably necessary at the end of the healing period shall be provided
by the employer.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-60 (1976). The 1980 amendment provides:
In cases in which total and permanent disability results, reasonable and
necessary nursing services, medicines, prosthetic devices, sick travel, medical,
hospital and other treatment or care shall be paid during the life of the injured
employee, without regard to any limitation in this title including the maximum
compensation limit. In cases of partial permanent disability prosthetic devices
shall be also furnished during the life of the injured employee or so long as
they are necessary.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-60 (1976).
24. 282 S.C. at 144, 318 S.E.2d at 9-10.
25. 280 S.C. at 533, 313 S.E.2d at 342.
26. Record at 3, 6, 8. The full Commission noted that the respondent had fallen and
struck his head. Id. at 6. This point was also in the respondent's brief. Brief of Respon-
dent at 5.
27. Record at 8.
28. 280 S.C. at 533, 313 S.E.2d at 342.
5
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tion 42-1-160 of the South Carolina Code29 so that its replace-
ment would be compensable as a medical expense under section
42-15-60.3 The appellants argued that injury to the respon-
dent's property was not a personal injury within the meaning of
section 42-1-160."' The court agreed, stating that when the stat-
utory terms are clear, words are given their plain and ordinary
meaning and the sole function of the court is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature.3 2 The court held that under the terms
of the statute the damage to the hearing aid was not compensa-
ble as a personal injury.33
In Smith the employee was injured severely while perform-
ing duties within the scope of his employment when a backhoe
severed his right leg.3 4 This created the need for an expensive
prosthetic device that proved to be unsatisfactory and would
need to be replaced every three to five years.35 The respondent
applied to the South Carolina Industrial Commission for life-
time replacement of the prosthetic device and the request was
approved .3  The Commissioner's order was affirmed by the full
Commission and the circuit court on the basis that the lifetime
replacement of the device would tend to lessen the period of dis-
ability within the meaning of section 42-15-60 of the Code."
The appellants challenged this reasoning and contended
that the legislature did not intend for the prosthetic devices to
29. Id. at 533, 313 S.E.2d at 342-43. Section 42-1-160 provides in relevant part:
"Injury" and "personal injury" shall mean only injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of the employment and shall not include a disease in any
form, except when it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident and
except such diseases as are compensable under the provisions of Chapter 11 of
this Title.
S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160 (1976).
30. For text of S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-15-60 (1976), see supra note 23.
31. 280 S.C. at 533, 313 S.E.2d at 343. The appellants also expressed a concern that
fraudulent claims could be asserted if "personal injury" was to include damage to an
employee's property. Brief of Appellant at 15-16.
32. 280 S.C. at 534, 313 S.E.2d at 343 (citing Worthington v. Belcher, 274 S.C. 366,
264 S.E.2d 148 (1980) and Hatchett "v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425, 137
S.E.2d 608 (1964)).
33. 280 S.C. 534, 313 S.E.2d at 343.
34. Record at 1.
35. 282 S.C. at 142, 318 S.E.2d at 8-9. The respondents witness stated that the
respondent's activities and energy contributed to the rapid deterioration of the original
prosthetic device.
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be construed as treatment tending to lessen the period of disa-
bility within the meaning of the section.38 The supreme court
agreed with the appellants on two grounds. First, the "plain
meaning" of the section did not include prosthetic devices
within the definition of treatment "tend[ing] to lessen the pe-
riod of disability."s Second, the 1980 amendment40 providing
for the lifetime replacement of prosthetic devices raised the pre-
sumption that these devices were not intended to be included in
the remedies afforded in the original section.4
The court, however, affirmed the circuit court on an alter-
nate ground, applying the 1980 amendment retroactively.42 The
court cited Hercules Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission43
and Byrd v. Johnson44 as support for the proposition that reme-
dial or procedural statutes can be retroactive when the statutes
do not violate a preexisting contractual obligation.45 The court
then held that the 1980 amendment to the statute was remedial
in nature and that it did not violate any existing contractual
obligations.
46
Smith and Lail represent the first attempt by appellate
courts in South Carolina to deal with prosthetic devices in the
area of workers' compensation. The decision in Lail follows the
general rule in most jurisdictions.47 In the future, the decision
will prevent recovery for any damaged property such as eye-
glasses under the workers' compensation laws. It may be possi-
ble to circumvent this decision by arguing that the injury to the
employee and to his prosthetic device arose concurrently and,
thus, the damage to the employee's property should be compen-
sable.48 Although argued by the respondent,4 9 this reasoning was
38. Id.
39. Id. at 143, 318 S.E.2d at 9. For text of statute, see supra note 23.
40. For text of amendment, see supra note 23.
41. 282 S.C. at 143, 318 S.E.2d at 9.
42. Id. at 143-44, 318 S.E.2d at 9-10.
43. 274 S.C. 137, 262 S.E.2d 45 (1980).
44. 220 N.C. 184, 16 S.E.2d 843 (1941).
45. 282 S.C. at 143-44, 318 S.E.2d at 9.
46. Id. at 144, 318 S.E.2d at 9-10.
47. See 1B A. LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 42.12 (1982); see generally
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 158 (1958).
48. See, e.g., Behl v. General Motors Corp., 25 Mich. App. 490, 181 N.W.2d 660
(1970); La Rose v. Hof, 28 A.D.2d 185, 283 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1967).
49. Brief of Respondent at 7-8.
19851
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not adopted by the court of appeals. It is not clear whether the
court rejected this reasoning outright or whether absence of any
mention in the stipulated facts of personal injury to the respon-
dent made this reasoning inapplicable in Lail. Under a different
set of facts, with a clear physical injury to the employee concur-
rent with the damage to the prosthetic device, this argument
might prevail.
The Smith decision, on the other hand, leaves more ques-
tions than answers. The court did not mention two previous de-
cisions that dealt with the retroactive application of a workers'
compensation statute. In both Ingle v. Mills,50 and McPherson
v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. 1 the supreme
court declined to apply a 1941 amendment to a workers' com-
pensation statute retroactively to accidents that occurred before
the amendment took affect. 2 In McPherson the court specifi-
cally stated, "The accident occurred on September 7, 1937, and
the employee's right to an award for the claimed disfigurement
of his hand was governed by the then existing law and was not
affected by the amendment of 1941 . . . ." 53The amendment
added a remedy for bodily disfigurement without requiring proof
of impaired employability. 54 The court did not consider, nor did
it discuss, the difference between the 1941 amendment and the
1980 amendment. 5 Thus, the reasoning behind the court's deci-
sion in this case is unclear.
50. 204 S.C. 505, 30 S.E.2d 301 (1944).
51. 208 S.C. at 76, 37 S.E.2d 136 (1946).
52. 204 S.C. at 511, 30 S.E.2d at 303; 208 S.C. at 81, 37 S.E.2d at 138. The 1941
amendment added the following section:
Provided, Further, That disfigurement shall also include the loss or serious or
permanent injury of any member or organ of the body for which no compensa-
tion is payable under the schedule of specific injuries set out in this Section.
And, Provided, Further, That in cases of body disfigurement it shall not be
necessary for the employee to prove that disfigurement handicaps him in re-
taining or procuring employment, or that it interferes with his earning
capacity.
1941 S.C. Acts 221, No. 162.
53. 208 S.C. at 81, 37 S.E.2d at 138 (citations omitted).
54. For text of the amendment, see supra note 52.
55. For other cases discussing the retroactivity issue, see Ship Shape v. Taylor, 397
So. 2d 1199 (Fla. App. 1981); Johnson v. Warren, 192 Kan. 310, 387 P.2d 213 (1963);
Noffskerr v. Barnett & Sons, 72 N.M. 471, 384 P.2d 1022 (1963); Holmes v. State Acci-
dent Ins. Fund, 38 Or. App. 145, 589 P.2d 1151 (1979); Lester v. State Compensation
Comm'r, 123 W.Va. 516, 16 S.E.2d 920 (1941).
[Vol. 37
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The court also did not fully discuss the impairment of con-
tract obligation issue.56 Given the retroactive application of the
amendment, an insurance carrier could acquire more of an obli-
gation than it had bargained for. In addition, because the court
did not specifically elucidate what would be considered remedial,
this decision could have a significant impact on workers' com-
pensation law. The uncertainty of which amendments will be
given retroactive effect places a burden on both insurance carri-
ers and practitioners in this area of the law.
Dennis J. Connolly
III. PUBLIC UTILITY RATE BASE DECISIONS
A. Exclusion of Operating Reserves from the Rate Base
In two recent utility rate cases, Parker v. South Carolina
Public Service Commission and South Carolina Electric and
GaS5 7 and Parker v. South Carolina Public Service Commission
and Duke Power Co.,58 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that operating reserves could not be included in a public utility's
rate base.5 9 The rate base, which is used by the Public Service
Commission (PSC) to fix reasonable rates, is "the amount of in-
vestment on which a regulated public utility is entitled to an
opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return."60 South Caro-
lina joins the majority of states that define operating reserves as
noninvestor-backed funds that should be excluded from the rate
base.6
South Carolina Electric and Gas (SCE&G) requested and
was granted an electrical rate increase. Irvin D. Parker, South
Carolina Consumer Advocate, appealed to the supreme court
from an order sustaining the PSC's approval of the increase.
56. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. See also Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
57. 280 S.C. 310, 313 S.E.2d 290 (1984).
58. 281 S.C. 215, 314 S.E.2d 597 (1984).
59. 280 S.C. at 313, 131 S.E.2d at 292; 281 S.C. at 216, 314 S.E.2d at 598.
60. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 270 S.C. 590, 600, 244
S.E.2d 278, 283 (1978).
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The Consumer Advocate argued that the trial court erred in up-
holding the PSC's inclusion in the rate base calculation of funds
in an injuries and damages reserve account.6 2
The court concluded that by the PSC's own order13 the rate
base should reflect actual investment of investors in the com-
pany.64 Since there was uncontroverted testimony that the re-
serve account was funded by ratepayers and not by investors,
the court reasoned that there was no justification for inclusion of
the reserve in the rate base. 5
Duke Power Company also requested and was granted a
rate increase. The Consumer Advocate appealed to the supreme
court from an order of the circuit court affirming the PSC's de-
termination. One ground for the appeal was the inclusion of the
company's operating reserve6 6 in the rate base. Relying solely on
its prior determination in South Carolina Electric and Gas, the
court summarily concluded that the record clearly showed that
the operating reserves were ratepayer funded.s
Although the record in both cases is devoid of evidence that
operating reserves are not ratepayer funded, there was testi-
mony that the PSC had never reduced the rate base by the
amount of operating reserves in the past.6 ' SCE&G argued that
operating reserves are merely a balance sheet item representing
amounts of booked but unpaid claims. The claims are paid out
later, SCE&G contended, and thus there is no fund of ratepayer-
supplied cash in the bank representing the balance sheet item."
The court failed to address these contentions.
Although these arguments were not a part of the record,
since the PSC has never deducted operating reserves in the past,
the PSC must have decided in its discretion that operating
reserves are either investor backed or cannot be categorized ei-
ther way. In fact, the PSC's order indicated that the Commis-
sion was unconvinced that the evidence presented warranted a
62. 280 S.C. at 313, 313 S.E.2d at 292.
63. Comm. Order No. 30-375 at 28.
64. 280 S.C. at 313, 313 S.E.2d at 292.
65. Id.
66. The Company's operating reserves were for property insurance, nuclear liability
insurance, and injuries and damages. Brief of Respondent PSC at 2.
67. 281 S.C. at 216, 314 S.E.2d at 598.
68. Record at 42, Duke Power Co.
69. Brief of Respondent SCE&G at 16, 17.
[Vol. 37
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departure from the previously adopted treatment of the issue. 0
The court pointed out, however, in South Carolina Electric and
Gas that discretion cannot be exercised without a factual basis.1
Moreover, the utility in both cases failed to use the opportunity
at the PSC hearing to present evidence that operating reserves
are not ratepayer funded. Therefore, the court was correct in
concluding that the PSC included reserves in the rate base with-
out evidentiary support that they were investor-backed.
South Carolina Electric and Gas and Duke Power Com-
pany are important because of their precedential value in ex-
cluding operating reserves from the determination of the rate
base. Of equal importance is the court's emphasis in both cases
that the rate base only represents funds provided by investors.
In future rate cases public utilities should not request rate in-
creases unless they are supported by a rate base that includes
only investor-backed funds.
B. Exclusion of Posttest Year Revenue From the Rate Base
In South Carolina Electric and Gas, the court also held
that minimal addition or loss of customers did not require ad-
justment of a utility's rate base.72 The Consumer Advocate ar-
gued that the PSC erred in its rate base calculation by excluding
the addition of eleven customers at the end of the test year.73
The PSC had adopted a historical test year method as the basis
for calculating a utility's rate base. Under this method the util-
ity's operations are observed and measured during a given pe-
riod of time, usually a year.
4
The supreme court concluded that adjustments in the test
year should be made only when an unusual situation exists
which shows that the figures are atypical; the addition of eleven
new customers produced a minimal change and was not an atyp-
ical circumstance warranting adjustment of SCE&G's rate
base.75 The court distinguished the routine occurrence of loss or
70. Brief of Respondent PSC at 8, Duke Power Co.
71. 280 S.C. at 313, 313 S.E.2d at 292 (quoting Brown v. Johnson, 276 S.C. 68, 275
S.E.2d 876 (1981)).
72. 280 S.C. at 312, 313 S.E.2d at 292.
73. Id.
74. Brief of Respondents at 4.
75. 280 S.C. at 312, 313 S.E.2d at 292.
19851
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addition of customers from the situation in Southern Bell Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Commission.6 In
that case an adjustment was made to account for an approved
wage increase that was to be effective just after the test year.
The court also cited, as an example of an atypical situation re-
quiring an adjustment, City of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Pub-
lic Utility Commission, 7 in which the test year was adjusted to
reflect a steel strike. The court in South Carolina Electric and
Gas was, therefore, concerned with preserving the integrity and
finality of the test year time limitations.
C. The Depreciation Rate of Nuclear Power Plants
In Duke Power Company the supreme court held that the
PSC erred in granting Duke Power a nuclear depreciation in-
crease in the absence of evidentiary support.78 The company had
requested the increase for the purpose of recognizing anticipated
decommissioning costs79 as part of the cost of depreciation.
The court emphasized that no major nuclear plant had been
decommissioned and that Duke Power's own witness conceded
that the proposed depreciation increase was based on "very un-
informed information." 80 In concluding that the record was in-
adequate to assess the depreciation rate, the court noted that
only opinion evidence had been produced to show that a four
percent depreciation rate was reasonable. Opinions, the court
observed, have no probative value without evidentiary showing
of the facts on which they are predicated.8 '
Although the court properly concluded that the nuclear de-
preciation rate should not be increased without evidentiary sup-
port, it is puzzling why the court remanded the issue to the PSC
for further consideration. As the court stated, no method of
decommissioning had ever been formulated by Duke Power, nor
any major plant been decommissioned. There is a scarcity of in-
76. 270 S.C. 590, 244 S.E.2d 278 (1978).
77. 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 341, 361, 144 A.2d 648, 659 (1958).
78. 281 S.C. at 217, 314 S.E.2d at 599.
79. Decommissioning costs include replacement, salvage value, tearing down the
building, storage, waste, etc. Id., 314 S.E.2d at 598.
80. Id.
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dustry data concerning decommissioning."2 In fact, Duke Power
based its claim for an increase in the nuclear depreciation rate
on the decision in Re Carolina Power & Light Co.,s3 in which the
court noted:
As with the preceding determination [of a proper salvage rate]
empirical data concerning nuclear plant depreciation rates is
almost totally lacking. Consequently, we will permit the 25-
year period as representing a reasonable estimation at this
time. If in the future, it develops that a 4 percent annual de-
preciation rate is no longer appropriate, an adjustment will be
made to account for any significant under or over
accumulations.8
4
In effect, the court in Carolina Power and Light was granting a
depreciation increase without evidentiary support. The South
Carolina Supreme Court's approach is sounder.
Duke Power Company strongly suggests that public utilities
would be wasting the PSC's and the court's time in the future
by requesting increases for items that cannot be supported by a
factual basis. The court made clear its position that it will not
affirm the PSC's determinations unless made with evidentiary
support.
D. Apportionment of Rate Increases
In Parker v. South Carolina Public Service Commission
and Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. 5 the South
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the PSC's apportionment and
calculation of a telephone rate increase. The court followed the
well-established principle that a reviewing court will not substi-
tute its view of the evidence for that of the PSC.8
82. See Re Northern States Power Co., 11 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 385, 394
(1975). Although this is a 1975 case, it is still relevant since nuclear plants generally have
a life span of 25-40 years. See generally Record at 46-50, Duke Power Co.
83. 26 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 75, 78 (1979).
84. Id.
85. 281 S.C. 22, 314 S.E.2d 148 (1984).
86. Id. at 23, 314 S.E.2d at 148-49. The court held that appellant's contention of
error in the PSC's inclusion in the rate calculation of a $17,800 charitable contribution
expense allocated to Southern Bell by its then parent company, AT&T, was moot. Prior
to the opinion, the legislature amended S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-320 (Supp. 1984) to pro-
hibit inclusion of a parent corporation's charitable contributions in rate calculations. The
court, noting that precedential value is of more importance than the effect on a particu-
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Southern Bell applied to the PSC in 1979 for a telephone
rate increase of 35.9 million dollars with 13.1 million dollars of
the increase to be alloted to "Supplemental Services. 's The
PSC approved an increase of 21 million dollars with 8.1 million
of that amount going to "Supplemental Services." The Con-
sumer Advocate appealed to the circuit court, arguing that the
full 13.1 million dollars sought by Southern Bell had to be dis-
tributed to "Supplemental Services" in order to comply with
residual pricing.88 The circuit court sustained the PSC's deter-
minations, and the supreme court affirmed.
The supreme court reasoned that although the allotment for
"Supplemental Services" fell short of the original request, it was
reasonable since only sixty percent of the overall request was au-
thorized by the PSC.8 Given the PSC's broad discretion in set-
ting reasonable rates, the court relied on the proposition that
the PSC's findings are presumptively correct and its orders rea-
sonable and valid.90
The PSC found that the amount alloted to "Supplemental
Services" met current cost, a requirement of residual pricing.
Since the court has consistently held that the PSC's findings will
be upheld unless they are without evidentiary support,9' the
holding in this case is sound.
In view of the broad discretion granted the PSC, the Con-
sumer Advocate would better serve consumers in future rate
cases by focusing on clearly unreasonable findings by the PSC.
This case indicates the court's unwillingness to tamper with the
lar rate case issue, determined that resolution of the charitable contribution issue would
have no precedential value. Id. at 25, 314 S.E.2d at 149-50.
87. "Supplemental Services" consist of discretionary nonessential options available
to telephone users, such as call forwarding and music on hold. Brief of Appellant at 2.
88. Residual pricing is a method adopted by the PSC under which rate increases are
first allocated to all categories other than Basic Service. Once discretionary categories are
priced to at least current cost, the remainder is allocated to Basic Service. 281 S.C. at 23-
24 n.1, 314 S.E.2d at 149 n.1.
89. Id. at 24, 314 S.E.2d at 149.
90. Id. (citing Petroleum Trans., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 255 S.C. 419, 179
S.E.2d 326 (1971); Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 258 S.C.
518, 189 S.E.2d 296 (1972)).
91. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 270 S.C. 590, 594, 244
S.E.2d 278, 280 (1978).
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PSC's findings unless there is absolutely no evidence to support
them or they are the result of caprice.
Michelle D. Brodie
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